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A definition and ethical evaluation of overdiagnosis: response 
to commentaries 
Carter, S. M., J. Doust, C. Degeling and A. Barratt (2016) 
 
It is a privilege to have respected colleagues engage with our ideas: such exchanges are critical 
to moving this new field forward. First, some paradigmatic issues.  
 
1. Rogers and Mintzker1 are correct to say we reject an objectivist conception of disease. 
However on p. 5, the authors imply that we think professional communities knowingly 
reject realism in developing disease definitions. This is not the case: rather we suspect that 
greater reflective insight into the constructedness of definitions in the professions may help 
counter the institutionalisation of overdiagnoses.   
2. Hofmann2 proposes that when professionals agree that diagnoses are correct (the first part 
of our definition), they are guided by knowledge about consequences (the second part of 
our definition): in his view this makes the second part of our definition redundant (p. 1 and 
throughout). We agree that, ideally, diagnoses would track consequences: unfortunately 
they often do not. Moynihan and colleagues, for example, have shown that expert panels 
rarely consider the consequences (harms particularly) of the disease definitions—or 
redefinitions—that they propose.3 Diagnoses, as argued, are negotiated social and political 
achievements determined on multiple grounds beyond outcomes, thus we reaffirm a 
distinction between correctness and consequences. 
3. Hofmann, similarly, rejects our observation that sometimes (note, not always) the 
distinction between overdiagnosis and false positives is blurred. In an ideal world this would 
be a bright line, but again, in practice, it is not. As we observed, a gold standard does not 
always exist, and for some conditions there are competing gold standards (e.g. Polycystic 
Ovary Syndrome: PCOS).4 In such cases the distinction will, unfortunately, be unclear. 
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4. On the distinction between medicalisation and overdiagnosis raised by Morrison,5 we have 
found earlier work by Hofmann extremely useful.6   
Overdiagnosis as harmless disease  
 
Rogers and Mintzker’s central concern (p. 2) is that we have widened the definition of 
overdiagnosis ‘to include any conditions in which there is a negative balance of benefits to 
harms, irrespective of the nature of the disease in question’.2 We agree. The authors contend 
that this is too broad; we respectfully counter that their definition is too narrow, for several 
reasons.  
 
First, overdiagnosis does not only apply to diagnosis of disease, but also increased risk (as 
Morrison notes5), conditions, and disorders.  
 
Diagnosis of harmless disease is one type of overdiagnosis. The most obvious example is 
diagnosis of indolent or regressive (non-progressive) cancers. These would never become 
symptomatic so if detected through screening they are always overdiagnosed.7 Epidemiologists 
refer to the bias introduced by such overdetection as length time bias; natural history models 
of the frequency of overdiagnosis often neglect it.7-10  
 
However this is only a subset of overdiagnosis.  
 
Some overdiagnosis is of harmful conditions, but where the harms likely to arise from the 
diagnosis, and subsequent treatment, exceed the harms produced by the condition itself. 
Examples are numerous, and include Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), genomic 
variation, low testosterone, mild depression, PCOS, mild blood pressure, and mildly elevated 
cholesterol. The symptoms that prompt a diagnosis of ADHD, for example, are not harmless, 
involving educational and behavioural challenges that limit children’s future interests. However, 
it seems likely that more harm than good is being done by diagnosing and medicating large 
numbers of children, particularly those with mild symptoms.11 The problem is that this 
diagnosis, currently considered correct, is producing an unfavourable balance of benefits to 
harms, not that ADHD is a harmless disease. 
 
Another subset of overdiagnosis is overdiagnosis due to the interaction between competing 
mortality and rate of progression of the diagnosed disease.8 This is well-described in cancer 
epidemiology, for example, having been  incorporated into at least six established models of 
breast cancer natural history.12 It occurs when a progressive (i.e. harmful) disease (such as 
cancer) is correctly diagnosed, but the person dies first of another cause. For example, a 
woman is diagnosed with early breast cancer via mammography, receives treatment, but dies 
from a heart attack before the breast cancer would—if undetected—have become 
symptomatic. Rogers and Mintzker1 (p. 4) and Hoffman2 (p. 1) assert that diagnosis and 
overdiagnosis should be linked to prognosis. In a perfect world this would be so, but it is: a) 
often not the case; and b) sometimes not possible because of overdiagnosis due to competing 
mortality, which is acknowledged as an inherent risk of early detection. Other examples include 
the diagnosis of elevated cholesterol or blood pressure in a patient with end-stage dementia. 
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Note that the commonly-observed discrepancy between increasing incidence and unchanged 
mortality in overdiagnosed conditions (Rogers and Mintzker1 p. 6) is not evidence that the 
disease is harmless, but that the diagnosis does not effectively decrease mortality. 
 
In our view, our definition captures the many types of overdiagnosis, while a definition limited 
to diagnosis of harmless disease does not. 
Implications of a broad definition of overdiagnosis based on the balance between benefits 
and harms 
 
Rogers and Minztker express concern about three main implications of our wider definition.1 
We agree that these implications follow from our definition, but find them unproblematic. 
 
1) The status of diagnoses (as overdiagnoses versus beneficial diagnoses) may change over 
time. We see this as inevitable, due to the constantly evolving nature of medical knowledge 
and practice.   
 
2) Sometimes overdiagnosis arises from features of the healthcare system rather than 
biological features of the disease. We accept this and believe it to be appropriate. For 
example, in very low income countries without functioning healthcare systems, a cancer 
diagnosis may provide nothing beyond a label, as basic care including cancer treatment, 
pain relief, psychological support, or palliation are unavailable. In this case, in our view, a 
cancer diagnosis would be an overdiagnosis. It may be a form of tragic overdiagnosis that 
had not previously occurred to us: the practitioner diagnoses correctly, and aims to serve 
her patients’ best interests, but unavoidably the diagnoses provide no benefit (and may 
harm by adding psychological suffering). If that health system changed so that cancer 
patients routinely received needed care, overdiagnosis arising from lack of access to care 
would stop. This highlights the structural nature of overdiagnosis and its solutions. 
 
3) On our definition, the effectiveness of treatment partly determines whether overdiagnosis 
occurs. Thus when routine treatments for certain diseases were more harmful than the 
diseases themselves, those diseases, on our definition, were always overdiagnosed. (This 
may well take in much of the history of medicine, including the example of starvation 
therapy for type 1 diabetes.) If treatments become more benign, the balance would shift. 
Rogers and Mintzker ask (p. 4): if treatment for early breast cancer was easy, effective and 
cheap, would mammographic screening still produce overdiagnosis? We think it would not. 
Invasive breast cancer can cause suffering and fatality if left untreated; current treatment 
for early breast cancer produces psychological, physical and financial harms and 
opportunity costs. Overdiagnosis is currently thought to be occurring in populations of 
screened women based on a potentially unfavourable or marginal balance between the 
number of women spared early breast cancer death versus the number of women harmed 
by treatment.13 Imagine, instead, that women could treat early breast cancer by swallowing 
one affordable, highly effective pill that had no side effects. The balance between breast 
cancer harms and treatment harms would radically shift, and—we contend—overdiagnosis 
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would no longer occur. Conversely, Rogers and Mintzker suggest that under our definition, 
Huntington’s Disease (a genetic disease which usually becomes symptomatic only in midlife) 
would always be overdiagnosed, because the disease is incurable. We disagree. Although it 
cannot be cured, in a well-functioning health system, a Huntington’s Disease diagnosis can 
be on-balance beneficial (and thus not overdiagnosis). Diagnosis can provide an explanation 
of symptoms, reassurance and understanding, access to reproductive autonomy, and 
services and treatments that would make life better with, than without, a diagnosis. To 
summarise, we are convinced that identifying overdiagnosis depends on recognising the 
balance of all of the broad medical, social and psychological benefits and harms that will 
arise from correct diagnosis and consequent treatment in a particular context, compared 
with the consequences of not diagnosing. 
Evaluating and balancing benefits and harms  
 
Both Hofmann2 and Rogers and Mintzker1 express concern regarding the complexity of 
evaluating and balancing benefits and harms. We agree that it is unfortunate that this task is so 
difficult, but can’t see any way of avoiding it. Our section on judging benefits and harms (p. 3-5) 
approaches the problem, and argues that decisions will likely combine experiential, technical, 
and deliberative approaches, avoiding over-reliance on a single perspective. Hofmann2 
expressed concern regarding community juries (p. 2) and subjective consumer judgements (p. 
2): we reaffirm that these should be part, but only part, of the answer to this difficult problem 
(we also need, for example, more transparent and systematic expert processes for defining 
diagnoses, and better empirical evidence about harms). Rogers and Mintzker14 (p. 6) suggest 
that calculating benefits and harms in populations is impossible because of variation in 
individuals’ values. This precise problem is a constant challenge to Evidence Based Medicine 
(EBM)15; in our view this has prompted continuous incremental refinement of EBM rather than 
its abandonment, and the same seems possible here. The line between beneficial diagnosis and 
overdiagnosis will never be absolute, and at both a population and an individual level, as 
Morrison notes,5 there will always be uncertainty in this judgement. Judgement is unavoidable 
nonetheless.  
A population-level definition  
 
Rogers and Mintzker1 and Hofmann2 each raise questions about our decision to define 
overdiagnosis at a population, rather than an individual, level. As we discussed, overdiagnosis is 
done to, and affects individuals (and their families), but can, currently, only be estimated 
(quantified, or ‘statistically inferred’ as Hofmann notes on p. 2) by examining population-level 
data. In well-financed healthcare systems, most diagnosed individuals will receive something 
like standard care; it is thus impossible to know what would have happened had the condition 
been left undetected and untreated (the non-identifiability problem). With future knowledge 
we may be able to accurately identify non-progressive, preclinical disease and thus be able to 
quantify overdiagnosis due to ‘harmless’ disease at an individual level, at the time of diagnosis. 
If achieved (and this new knowledge was incorporated into diagnostic standards) this could 
reduce the problem of overtreatment and potentially of overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis due to 
competing mortality, however, will never be knowable at an individual level, absent 
circumstances in which no intervention is offered to people with progressive clinical disease. So 
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at least some overdiagnosis will only ever be statistically inferred in populations, at least for the 
foreseeable future. And, as we noted, overdiagnosis entails corporate harms via the re-
orientation of health systems, which only make sense at a population level. 
 
We do not, as Hofmann suggests, wish to prevent individuals from receiving probabilistic risk 
information from population-based studies (p.2). Evidence suggests that well-designed decision 
aids (based on population-based evidence) can improve individuals’ knowledge, reduce 
decisional conflict, and increase accuracy of risk perception.16 That such aids cannot remove the 
non-identifiability problem is not, in our view, a reason to abandon risk communication 
altogether.  
Relevant professional communities  
 
Both Hofmann2 and Rogers and Mintzker1 raise questions about the ‘relevant professional 
community’ that might make a judgement about the correctness of a diagnostic label. We agree 
that a lot turns on ‘relevance’, and that this needs further elaboration. Our rough working 
conception is that a relevant professional community has: 1) critical mass; 2) shared standards 
for diagnosis (whether formally developed or instantiated through practice); and 3) ability to 
apply such diagnoses in practice (regulated or not). This deliberately elastic conception extends 
beyond formal structures of western medical authority (e.g. it could include various 
complementary and alternative medical practitioners, and thus make it possible for them to 
engage in overdiagnosis); however it also deliberately excludes idiosyncratic outliers (mavericks 
not practicing according to any standard). 
 
Relevance is unavoidably arguable. On p. 2-3, for example, Hofmann asserts that there is no 
relevant professional community that supports diagnoses of Low T. Contra this, others see the 
Low T campaign as a textbook exercise in building off-label prescription;17 and evidence 
suggests that this greatly increased prescribing rates.18 This could not have occurred without a 
professional community willing to adopt ‘Low T’ as a correct diagnosis. We emphasise that in 
our definition, the relevant professional community need only accept that the diagnosis is 
correct. As discussed above, we do not assume that this shared view of correctness contains 
any considered agreement about benefits, harms or prognosis. This, we believe, obviates the 
concerns Hofmann expresses regarding misdirected and tragic diagnosis on p.3. However we 
agree with Hofmann, and Rogers and Mintzker, that further elaboration of the ‘relevant 
professional community’ component of our definition is needed.   
The normative typology 
 
As acknowledged in the commentaries, the three types are ideal: we do not suggest that they 
will ever be perfectly expressed, and the degree to which instances of overdiagnosis have 
tragic, misdirected or predatory features will always be arguable. Hofmann is concerned (p. 3) 
about reliance on un-knowable intentions, a well-worked normative problem. We note that, as 
is common in public health ethics (e.g. 19-21) our analysis relies not on intentions but on goals. It 
is also not uncommon, through legal discovery and other means, for evidence of relatively 
predatory collective or institutional goals to become available, particularly in respect of 
commercial actors.  
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We expect that it will be some time before these matters are settled, and look forward to 
continuing to debate them with our colleagues.   
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